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Abstract
Does bundling trigger mergers in energy industries? We observe mergers between
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1 Introduction
A trend towards deregulation of utilities industries, such as energy or telecommunica-
tions, is observed worldwide. This has an impact on market structures and pricing strate-
gies. In particular, market structures shift from monopolies1 to oligopolies. Moreover, in
energy industries, we observe multi-market mergers between rms belonging to various
oligopolies. Such mergers enable rms to bundle several energies.2 For instance, they
provide packages of two di¤erent energies like gas and electricity. A signicant example
is the merger case between E.ON and Ruhrgas on the German market. Although the
merger proposal is rejected in 2002 by the competition authority, the Federal Minister of
Economics and Technology even so approves the merger in 2003 (Marsden et al., 2007).
Before this acquisition, Ruhrgas was the rst gas producer in Germany while E.ON, the
rst electricity one. E.ON only owned holdings in a few local subsidiaries of gas supply.
Thus, the new leader of the German energy market now supplies bi-energy bundles. We
also remark that other mergers become e¤ective on this market straight after. Indeed,
electricity supplier EWE merges with gas suppliers Cuxhaven and SWB in 2003. This
substantiates the merger wave phenomenon. The following question therefore becomes
important: do bundling strategies trigger mergers in energy markets? This type of in-
centive could better explain the convergence phenomenon in energy industries. In this
paper, we study the emergence of these mergers. In order to carry out our analysis, we
use a horizontally di¤erentiated model derived from Reisinger (2006). It allows to study
bundle competition. This analysis can be interpreted as a modelling of a competition
between two electricity rms and two gas rms.3 We build a merger game allowing to
underline a merger wave phenomenon. This phenomenon is due to the ability to supply
bi-energy bundles4 once a merger is achieved. Bundling entails two e¤ects. The rst is a
price discrimination one. The second is a competition one. The trade-o¤ between these
e¤ects and merger choices causes an increase in prots.
The results which we have just evoked allow to better assess a relevant phenom-
enon in the energy markets: the convergence phenomenon. Usually, convergence refers
to a process that reduces di¤erences between activities. It corresponds to a gradual
integration of formerly separate industries. To describe convergence in the energy in-
dustry, we analyze a specic trend: the convergence between gas and electricity.5 This
trend is widely observed during the 1990s in the US and is now described in Europe too
(Verde, 2008). Multi-market mergers in energy industry participate in this convergence
phenomenon. Indeed, downstream mergers allow the diversication of energy supplies
and clearly participate in the convergence phenomenon. For instance, the inter-industry
merger Dong/Elsam/EnergiE2 (European Commission, 2006a) refers to the integration
between the Danish gas incumbent and Danish companies active in the electricity sec-
1Moreover, administrative "principle of specialization" that formerly assigned public monopoly oper-
ators to produce only a single specialized good, is removed.
2For instance in France, the dominant operators propose energy and service packages to professionals
such as "Provalys" for Gaz de France and "Essentiel Pro" for Electricité de France.
3As illustration, we can lean on the competition which existed in the German energy market before
the mergers which we have just quoted.
4We show that bundling creates an incentive to merge. Nevertheless, there exist other merger motives
in energy markets.
5For more explanations about convergence between gas and electricity, see Toh (2003) and Bazart
(2007).
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tor. The rm could now exploit their complementarities and supply bi-energy bundles.
Another example is Gaz de France/Suez merger proposition submitted to the European
Commission in 2005. This corresponds to a national merger but concerning both mid-
stream and downstream markets. Colette Lewiner (a senior vice president at Capgemini
in Paris) says that this merger could have been "a plus for competition if Suez and GDF
bundle their o¤erings to give customers like industry better o¤erings, perhaps in the form
of a single bill for electricity, gas and water" (International Herald Tribune, 2006). As
the proposition was declined by the authorities, Gaz de France has to purchase electric-
ity to Electricité de France in order to supply bi-energy bundles. In 2008, the Gaz de
France/Suez merger becomes e¤ective because European Commission approves it. This
example suggests that bundling strategies may incite to merge. Empirical studies show
that a lot of consumers6 use several types of energies (Bernard et al., 1996 and Nesbakken,
2001). So bundling strategies may be a fundamental reason for merger decisions.7 Despite
the prevalence of this particular type of merger, to our knowledge they are not analyzed
by the theoretical literature. The aim of this paper is to ll this gap.
Before modelling the competition with bundles, we give more details about the bundling
literature. Bundling refers to the practice of selling two or more goods at a unique price.8
The economic literature on bundling isolates several e¤ects. One of the main e¤ects is
price discrimination. Bundling allows to sort consumers according to their willingness to
pay. This characteristic is analyzed by Adams and Yellen (1976) for a monopoly produc-
ing two goods. In analysis dealing with specic cases, they show that mixed bundling
is generally the optimal strategy9 since the correlation between the goods is negative.
Whinston (1990), Nalebu¤ (2004) and Peitz (2008) underscore the fact that a two-market
monopolistic rm can deter the entry of competitors by bundling10 if the potential en-
trant can enter only one market. In this framework, Nalebu¤ shows that pure bundling is
optimal. A second e¤ect of bundling to consider is, in competitive environments, a com-
petition e¤ect. Anderson and Leruth (1993) analyze bundling in a complementary-goods
duopoly. In their view, independent pricing is a dominant strategy in the commitment
case. Economides (1993), in the same framework, shows that rms follow mixed bundling
strategies in the Nash equilibrium. Firms, however, make lower prots than they do when
adopting an independent pricing strategy. Armstrong and Vickers (2008) examine prin-
cipally a unit-demand model where consumers may buy one product from one rm and
another product from another rm under nonlinear pricing. They show that bundling
generally acts to reduce prot and welfare and to boost consumer surplus.11 However,
they consider an intrinsic extra shopping cost when consumers purchase each good at dif-
ferent locations. Thanassoulis (2007) nds that if buyers incur rm specic costs or have
shop specic tastes then competitive mixed bundling lowers consumer surplus overall and
raises prots.
6Note that professionals also consume several energies at the same time.
7This reason is evoked by Jacobsen et al. (2006).
8When a rm sells its goods both separately and bundled in a package, this rm follows a mixed
bundling strategy. When a rm commits to supply only the bundle, it follows a pure bundling strategy.
9Schmalensee (1984) shows their results are robust to a bivariate normal distribution. As for them,
Mc Afee et al. (1989) generalize these results to almost all distributions.
10In Nalebu¤ (2004), bundling is optimal even without any commitment.
11By contrast, when consumers buy all their products from one rm (the one-stop shopping model),
nonlinear pricing leads to higher prot and welfare but often lower consumers surplus, than linear pricing.
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Reisinger (2006) also studies a duopoly that produces two types of horizontally di¤er-
entiated goods. He analyzes a framework for which consumers buy one unit of each good
with neither substitutability, nor complementarity e¤ects created by variants choices for
each type of goods. The correlation of the reservation prices is expressed by the correlation
of consumers location on each market. He shows that there are two e¤ects created by
bundling: the well-known "sorting e¤ect" and the "business-stealing e¤ect," which results
from bundle competition. Reisinger shows that rms have an incentive to adopt a mixed
bundling strategy. Nonetheless, the e¤ect on prots is ambiguous. If the correlation of
reservation prices is negative, then the competition e¤ect dominates and the bundling
strategy lowers prots. Such rms are in a prisoners dilemma situation. On the other
hand, if the correlation of reservation prices is positive, then the sorting e¤ect allows rms
to make higher prots.
We use the model of Reisinger (2006) in order to analyze the impact of bundling on
merger incentives. We therefore consider two horizontally di¤erentiated markets, that
are electricity and natural gas markets. As Reisinger (2006), the link between these two
markets is the correlation of consumers locations. Nevertheless, four rms are present.
Two rms produce electricity, and the two others supply natural gas. In their respective
markets, rms compete in prices. We build an endogenous merger game and assume that
monopolization was illegal. First, we exclude the post-merger bundling strategy. Second,
we remove this assumption in order to analyze the e¤ect of bundling strategy on merger
incentives. In a basic model in which bundling is not considered, we nd that there is no
incentive to merge. Once a merger is achieved, however, as we show, there is an incentive
to adopt a mixed bundling strategy. Otherwise, the bundling strategy triggers a merger
wave. Moreover, we show that relative to the correlation of reservation prices, two types of
mergers are achieved. Furthermore, while Reisinger (2006) shows that there is a prisoners
dilemma, we show that the di¤erent types of mergers allow this dilemma to be removed.
Finally, from a welfare point of view, we show that bundling is less harmful than Reisinger
suggests (2006).
In order not to neglect merger interactions in our model, we endogenize merger deci-
sions. In this sense, our study is closely linked to the endogenous merger literature, some
of which seeks to explain mechanisms preventing mergers as the "insiders dilemma12"
previously evoked in the exogenous merger model of Stigler (1950). For instance, Kamien
and Zang (1990, 1993) and Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005b) also consider the "insiders
dilemma". Moreover, Kamien and Zang (1990, 1993) add auction mechanisms to take
into account rms acquisitions processes. We care about the "insiders dilemma" but
without any auction mechanism. Indeed, we are not interested in surplus sharing rule.
On the other hand, we did deal with other characteristics found in the endogenous merger
literature, such as taking all rms combinations into consideration. For instance, some
endogenous merger models allow merger interactions to be revealed (Nilssen and Sorgard,
1998). More particularly, some models attempt to emphasize the phenomenon of preemp-
12"The insiders dilemma means that a protable merger does not occur, because it is even more
protable for each rm to unilaterally stands as an outsider" (Lindqvist and Stennek, 2005). Salant,
Switzer and Reynolds (1983) validate the result of Stigler (1950) when rms compete in a Cournot
fashion. Indeed, they show that if a takeover does not merge more than 80 per cent of an industry, such
a takeover is not carried out because outsiders earn more than insiders. Going further, Inderst and Wey
(2004) focus on probability of hold-up (respectively hold-out) in a merger game that includes cases for
which outsiders benet from mergers.
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tive mergers (Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005a, Brito 2003, Matsushima, 2001). Finally,
other models, such as those of Fauli-Oller (2000) or Nilssen and Sorgard (1998), focus on
merger waves phenomena. As the same type of merger interactions are possible in our
framework, we build a merger game based upon Nilssen and Sorgard (1998). Contrary to
Nilssen and Sorgard (1998), we do not restrict merger possibilities in an ad hoc fashion.
Indeed, the only restriction concerning merger choices is due to the prohibition of the
monopolization. Some merger choices are then mutually exclusive but this is not deter-
mined in an ad hoc way. This is due to the fact that a homogeneous merger is de facto
incompatible with a heterogeneous merger.
The following section presents the basic model. The section 3 introduces the bundling
strategy on energy markets. Section 4 gives the equilibrium of the game and the social
welfare analysis. The nal section presents some concluding remarks.
2 Basic model
Throughout this section, we exclude bundling strategies. We start with the assumptions
of the competition game. Next, a merging game is dened. Finally, we solve this game
in order to establish the benchmark, before introducing the bundling strategy in the next
section.
2.1 Assumptions
We will consider a four-rm industry. Two rms produce the electricity A at the marginal
cost cA and two others produce the gas B at the marginal cost cB. In order not to introduce
bias13 in our bundling analysis, we will assume that production costs are linear. Each
type of energy is horizontally di¤erentiated. For each energy, the product variants are the
locations of the rms on a circle whose circumference is normalized to 1. According to the
type and the location of their output, rms are named either Ai or Bj with i; j = 1; 2.
The rm A1 (respectively B1) produces the good A, electricity (respectively B; gas) and
is located at 0 on circle A (respectively B) while the rm A2 (respectively B2) produces
the same energy14 but is located at 1
2
. There is a continuum of consumers, and, without
loss of generality, we normalize its total mass to 1. Consumers locations on both circles
are x = (xA; xB). Each consumer wishes to buy one and only one unit of each type of
energy.15 This allows us to focus on the pure strategic e¤ect of bundling. Firms compete
in prices in each energy market. Their prices are denoted by piA and p
i
B. Thus, consumers
can choose between four product combinations. They can buy either the electricity from
rm A1 and the gas from rm B1, i.e., (A1B1), or the electricity from rm A2 and the
gas from rm B2, i.e., (A2B2), or the electricity from rm A1 and the gas from rm B2,
i.e., (A1B2), or the electricity from rm A2 and the gas from rm B1, i.e., (A2B1).
For instance, a customer located at 0  xA; xB  1=2, buying the electricity from rm
13In this model, bundling must not be incited by e¢ciency gains, for instance.
14Note that we deliberately choose to place rms at locations 0 and 1
2
, but without loss of generality.
Indeed, if we placed rms more closely, results would be qualitatively the same. They would just be
shifted relative to .
15Electricity and gas can be used for lighting and heating needs, for instance.
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A1 and the gas from rm B2 has an indirect utility of:
V (xA; xB) = KA   p1A   tA(xA)2 +KB   p2B   tB(1=2  xB)2. (1)
Utilities from consumption (gross of prices and transportation costs) of electricity, A and
gas, B are given by KA and KB. The two markets (or the two energies) are denoted by
k = A;B, and we note tk the transportation cost associated with circle k. Without loss of
generality16, we assume tA > tB > 0. The consumer reservation price R
i
k, for the variant
i of the energy k, is given by Kk  tk(di)2, where di is the shortest arc length between the
consumers location and rm i on circle k. In order that all consumers buy both types
of energies in each price equilibrium, we assume that Kk is su¢ciently high. Reservation
prices can be linked to the locations of consumers. Indeed, the joint distribution function
of reservation values G(RiA j RiB), and so, the correlation between reservation prices for
the energy from location i on the two markets can be deduced from the joint distribution
function of consumer location F (xA j xB). Like Reisinger (2006), we give a structure to
this distribution function. It is a simple function expressing all correlations of reservation
prices. Thus, if a consumer is located at xA on circle A, then this consumer is located at
xB =

xA + 
xA +    1
if xA +   1
if xA +  > 1
on circle B, where 0    1=2. This means a -shift of all consumers on circle B. If
 = 0, the reservation price correlation is one. Through adopting this simple structure,
correlations of reservation values can be obtained easily by altering . The correlation
coe¢cient [RA; RB]() =
Cov[RA;RB ]()
(RA)(RB)
is given17 by 1   302 + 603   304. By way of
illustration, note that for small  values, if a consumer has a high reservation price for
the electricity of rm A1, then s/he has a high reservation value for the gas of rm B1.
If a consumer has a high reservation price for the electricity of rm A2, then s/he has a
high reservation value for the gas of rm B2. Conversely, a high value of  implies that
consumers have very di¤erent reservation prices for the two energies sold at the same
location on each circle. Now, we dene the merger game in which the four rms are
involved.
2.2 Merger game
We assume that monopolization is illegal.18 Thus, potential mergers necessarily involve
rms from two di¤erent markets. We build a two-stage game. At the rst stage, rms
choose either to merge or not to merge. At the second stage, rms choose independently
to follow either a bundling strategy or an independent pricing one. Then they compete in
prices. The previous section already presents these stage assumptions. We now describe
the rst stage. Each electric rm Ai can choose to merge with the gas rm with the same
location in the gas market. We call this type of merger a "homogeneous merger". Each
electric rm Ai can also choose to merge with the gas rm located at the opposite in the
16The limit cases tB ! tA and tB ! 0 are studied in section 4.
17The proof is given by Reisinger (2006).
18There is always an incentive to monopolize the electricity market A or the gas market B as long as
reservation prices of consumers are su¢ciently high. But this is detrimental for consumers and generally,
authorities forbid monopolization.
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gas market. In this case, the merger is called a "heterogeneous merger".19 Finally, each
electric rm Ai can choose not to merge (see Figure 1 below).
Insert Figure 1
Firms take sequential and non-cooperative decisions. The sequential nature of the
game is similar to Nilssen and Sorgard (1998). By this way, we focus on merger inter-
actions. Moreover, we avoid coordination problems between rms. 20 Without loss of
generality, we assume decisions are made by electric rms of the market A. Results are
exactly the same if decisions are made by gas rms of market B. We also assume that
electric rm A1 makes its merger decision rst, but the results are the same if electric
rm A2 chooses rst. In this paper, we look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE).
Therefore, we solve the game backward. Thus, if we solve competition subgames, then
we solve the merger game. Concerning mergers, we do not dene any prot sharing rule.
We focus exclusively on the following question: "Is the merger prot higher than the
pre-merger prot sum of rms involving in the merger?" Indeed, if such is the case, there
is necessarily a prot-sharing rule that gives an incentive to merge. On the other hand,
in parallel with the "strategic motives" consideration (Nilssen and Sorgard, 1998), we
take into account interactions between merger decisions. To illustrate, two-rm merger
expectation can either incite or not incite another two-rm merger. Therefore, merger
decisions are endogenous in this model. At the rst stage, both electric rms A1 and A2
choose to merge or not to merge with gas rms of market B. Thus, we present this game
in Figure 2 below.
Insert Figure 2
Now, we solve the game without considering bundling strategy. This constitutes the
benchmark.
19To better illustrate these merger types, consider an example in energy. The homogeneous merger
could be a merger between the rm A1, which supplies electricity, and the rm B1, which provides gas.
The rm A1 has the reputation of providing a vaster supply network than A2, and the rm B1 has the
reputation of supplying a more performant technical aid than B2 does. In the same way, the heterogeneous
merger could be a merger between the rm A2 and the rm B1. The rm A2 has a much wider range of
services than A1 does, and regarding the gas storage the rm B2 has a better reputation than B1 does.
20In a simultaneous game, a coordination problem can arise by two ways. First, the potential buyers
bid for the same target. So we could use a method for selecting a buyer rm and the repetition of the
simultaneous game would provide the same result. Second, rms coordinate on the wrong continuation
equilibrium for intermediate values of delta. But whatever are the type of the rst merger and the value of
delta, there is an incentive to achieve a second merger by repeating the game because of mixed bundling
(see proof of proposition 1 in Reisinger (2006) for the homogeneous case). If the simultaneous game is
repeated, rms anticipate this and bid for the good continuous equilibrium since the wrong gives less
prot.
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2.3 Benchmark: mergers and independent pricing
By symmetry, we deduce from the game tree that there are ve possible outcomes. There
may be either two homogeneous mergers, two heterogeneous mergers, only one homoge-
neous merger, only one heterogeneous merger, or, nally, no merger. We determine prices
and prots of the di¤erent games outcomes in Appendix 6.1. We note that zAiBj is the
prot of the merged rm AiBj where z = 1; 2 is the number of mergers. Thus, we can
establish the following equation:
zAiBj = Ai +Bj , 8i; j; z = 1; 2. (2)
We therefore deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If bundling strategy is not considered, then there is no incentive to merge.
When they cannot provide bundles, the monoproduct rms are indi¤erent as to whether
to merge or not to merge. Since markets are independent, there is no competition e¤ect
due to mergers. Therefore, there is no incentive to merge.21 After a merger, prices are
unchanged and the global prot of a merger is merely the prot sum of the merging rms.
In this case of indi¤erence, we assume that rms choose not to merge. After the bench-
mark analysis, the following section considers a case where merged rms are able to follow
a mixed bundling strategy. Thus, we focus on pure e¤ects of bundling in the competition
game and on their impacts on incentives to merge.
3 Mergers and mixed bundling
In this section, we introduce mixed-bundling strategy.22 Indeed, if two rms merge, they
can supply a bundle composed of both electricity and gas. A merged rm AiBj 8i; j = 1; 2
can o¤er a package composed of electricity Ai and gas Bj. This bundle is denoted by
(ABij) and its price is pijAB. Mixed bundling may enable rms to attract marginal con-
sumers by lowering the bundle price.23 A consumer who buys the energies from di¤erent
rms in the independent pricing case can then prefer to buy the two energies from the same
rm. The desutility when purchasing its non-preferred variant of a energy is balanced by
a lower price. We show that results depend on correlation of reservation prices. In this
section, we analyze game outcomes. Here, a mixed bundling strategy is possible. Thus,
we study competition in each outcome. We exclude, however, the non-merged outcome,
because bundling is not possible in this case, and so, prots are already computed in
the previous section. For simplicity, we analyze only the merger waves outcomes, i.e., the
two-merger cases. We will explain why it is su¢cient to solve the game in section 4. First,
we study the case of homogeneous two-rm merger. This corresponds to Reisingers model
(2006). Next, a sub-section is devoted to the case of heterogeneous two-rm mergers.
21Here, we model no other mechanism able to create a merger incentive. For instance, considering
synergies could create an incentive to merge.
22We excluded the pure bundling strategy, because rms have no incentive to manage without an
additional discrimination tool, given that rms are in competition.
23Firms supplying bi-energy packages o¤er discounts to consumers buying packages instead of indepen-
dent energies. For instance, Gaz de France/Suez proposes the bi-energy package at the price of the two
separate energies minus 36e (respectively 66e) for one year (respectively for two years).
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3.1 Bundling and homogeneous mergers
We assume electric rms Ai merged with gas rms Bj, 8i = j, with i; j = 1; 2. In this
conguration, customers choose between four product combinations. They can either buy
the bundle of rm A1B1, i.e., (AB11), at price p
11
AB, or buy the bundle of rm A2B2, i.e.,
(AB22), at price p22AB. They can also purchase either the electricity A from rm A1B1 and
the gas B from rm A2B2, i.e., the product combination (A1B2), at price p
1
A+ p
2
B, or the
electricity A from rm A2B2 and the gas B from rm A1B1, i.e., the consumption option
(A2B1), at price p2A + p
1
B. We want to determine prices and prots when rms adopt a
mixed bundling strategy, but this is interesting only if rms have an incentive to bundle.
Thus, we use the lemma of Reisinger (2006):
Lemma 1 If  > 0, i.e  < 1, then in equilibrium, homogeneously-merged rms follow a
mixed-bundling strategy.
Proof. See Reisinger (2006)
In the benchmark, there is no merger incentive. Merger incentives are only due to
bundling strategies. Lemma 1 shows that if there are two mergers, each rm follows a
mixed bundling strategy. In the same manner, every rm is incited to merge because
merger incentives and bundling incentives are exactly the same here. In this case, two
homogeneous mergers are achieved. The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma
1 given by Reisinger (2006). For this reason, we only studied the two-homogeneous merger
outcome.
Lemma 2 Respectively for   3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
), 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) <   1
3
tB
6tA
, and  > 1
3
tB
6tA
, equilib-
rium prots are given by:
2AiBj =
1
8
(tA + tB) +
2
9
2
tAtB
tA + tB
, (3)
2AiBj =
1
8
(tA + tB) +
tAtB(4(tA + tB)  2(6tA + tB)  42tA)
2(tA   tB)2 , (4)
2AiBj =
1
8
tA   7
72
tB. (5)
Proof. See Reisinger (2006)
First, we assume that  is small, i.e the correlation of reservation prices is positive.
In this case, there are four consumption combinations: (AB11), (A1B2), (AB22) and
(A2B1). Figure 3 below presents this demand conguration (i):
Insert Figure 3
Second, we assumed that  is high. In this case, there are six consumption options:
(A1B2); (AB11), (AB22), (A2B1), (AB22) and (AB11). Figure 4 below presents this
demand conguration (ii):
Insert Figure 4
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For the homogeneous mergers, the prot level explanation is similar to Reisinger
(2006): in every case, rms compete, à la Bertrand, on each horizontally di¤erentiated
energy. But here, they can use bundling. Thus, bundle demands appear. When the corre-
lation is high ( small), rms compete with their own separate energies by lowering their
bundle prices. Therefore, they have no incentive to decrease their bundle prices relative
to the prices sum of the separate energies in the independent pricing strategy. Further-
more, bundling allows for consumers to be sorted and prots to be raised. Moreover, this
e¤ect increases when correlation decreases. Indeed, each rm can raise the prices of its
separate energies. Thus, prots increase. On the other hand, the correlation decrease
makes consumers more and more indi¤erent to the two bundles. Consequently, for a su¢-
ciently weak correlation ( > HM1 ), each bundle competes directly with the rivals bundle.
Firms must lower their bundle prices in order to maintain their market shares. However,
when this new competition for this level of correlation (HM1 ), is integrated, the prot
maximization does not give an equilibrium. Hence the necessity of computing a touching
equilibrium (Economides 1984) between this correlation threshold and the one for which
the equilibrium becomes stable (HM2 ). This implies a linear drop in prices to keep the
initial demand structure (i). This new e¤ect dominates the positive sorting e¤ect. The
decrease in prices entails both a drop in prots and, for a su¢ciently high correlation, a
prisoners dilemma concerning the bundling strategy decision. We compute the equilib-
rium of the competiton game following a homogeneous merger wave. Results, however,
can di¤er when mergers are heterogeneous. Subsequently, we study this game outcome.
3.2 Bundling and heterogeneous mergers
We assume electric rms Ai merge with gas rms Bj, 8i 6= j, with i; j = 1; 2. In this
conguration, customers choose between four product combinations. They can either buy
the bundle of rm A1B2, i.e., (AB12) at price p
12
AB, or buy the bundle of rm A2B1, i.e.,
(AB21) at price p21AB. They also can either purchase the electricity A from rm A1B2
and the gas B from rm A2B1, i.e., the product combination (A1B1) at price p
1
A + p
1
B,
or purchase the electricity A from rm A2B1 and the gas B from rm A1B2, i.e., the
product combination (A2B2) at price p2A + p
2
B. We want to determine prices and prots
when rms follow a mixed-bundling strategy but this is interesting only if rms have an
incentive to bundle. Thus, we establish this lemma:
Lemma 3 If  < 1
2
, i.e  >  1, then, in equilibrium, heterogeneously-merged rms follow
a mixed-bundling strategy.
Proof. see Appendix 6.2
In the benchmark, there is no merger incentive. Merger incentives are only due to
bundling strategies. Lemma 3 shows that if there are two mergers, each rm adopts a mixed
bundling strategy. In the same manner, every rm is incited to merge because merger
incentives and bundling ones are exactly the same here. In this case, two heterogeneous
mergers are achieved. The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 3. For this
reason, we only study the two-heterogeneous merger outcome.
First, equilibrium demand congurations will be described.24 These depend on . We
assume  is small, that is,  is high, i.e the correlation is positive. In this case, there
24See Appendix 6.2.
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are six consumption options: (A1B1), (AB12), (AB21), (A2B2), (AB21), and (AB12).
Below, Figure 5 presents this demand conguration (iii):
Insert Figure 5
Second, we assume  is high. In this case, there are no longer four consumption
options left: (AB12), (A2B2), (AB21), and (A1B1). Figure 6 below presents this demand
conguration (iv):
Insert Figure 6
Equilibrium prices and prots are computed in Appendix 6.2. Thus, we just have
to calculate for which value of  the demand conguration is changing. If both rms set
equilibrium prices as in Appendix 6.2.3, then there exists a  threshold from which bundle
(AB12) is no longer followed by (AB21) but by (A2B2). Calculating this threshold leads
to  = HT1 =
1
6
  tb
6ta
. On the other hand, if rms set equilibrium prices as in Appendix
6.2.4, then we nd the threshold HT2 beyond which the second demand conguration
arises. This threshold is given by  = HT2 =
ta tb
5ta+tb
. For more details, refer to Appendix
6.2.5. For  between 1
6
  tb
6ta
and ta tb
5ta+tb
, rms set prices in such a way that the last
consumer purchasing (AB12) is indi¤erent in the choice between (AB12), (AB21) and
(A2B2). Therefore, the rst demand conguration still holds. The determination of the
equilibrium prices in this region25 is similar to the one in a standard Hotelling model when
we move from local monopoly to competition (Economides, 1984, Gabszewicz and Thisse,
1986). We therefore establish the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Respectively for   1
6
  tb
6ta
, 1
6
  tb
6ta
<   ta tb
5ta+tb
, and  > ta tb
5ta+tb
, equilibrium
prots are given by:
2AiBj =
1
8
tA   7
72
tB, (6)
2AiBj =
1
8
(tA + tB) +
tAtB
2(tA   tB)2 (3(tB   tA) + 2(8tA + tB)  4
2tA), (7)
2AiBj =
1
8
(tA + tB)  (1  4(2   )) tAtB
18(tA + tB)
. (8)
Proof. See Appendix 6.2
Intuitions about prot levels are the same as in the case of homogeneous mergers, but
reversed relative to the correlation. In the heterogeneous merger case, bundles are com-
posed of goods with opposite locations. Subsequently, and contrary to the homogeneous
merger case, the bundle competition e¤ect appears for low correlation values. In the same
way, the sorting e¤ect is also reversed relative to the correlation. Indeed, by sorting con-
sumers, rms can make more prots than they can in cases of independent pricing, when
the correlation is weak. Furthermore, when the correlation is high ( < HT2 ), the compe-
tition e¤ect between bundles appears and dominates the sorting e¤ect. This is due to the
25For more details, see appendix 6.2.6.
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opposite locations of merged rms on each energy market. We nd a prisoners dilemma,
but now for high correlation values. And now that competition outcomes corresponding
to merger waves are studied, in the next section we compute and analyze the SPNE of
the game.
4 Equilibrium of the game
In this section, we solve the whole game. Next, we analyze the welfare and competition
policy implications.
4.1 Equilibrium computation
At the equilibrium of the merger game, we can write the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, a merger wave occurs and rms choose a mixed bundling
strategy.
Proof. The merger game presented in Figure 2 establishes ve possible outcomes. If there
are two homogeneous mergers (respectively heterogeneous) and according to the Lemma
1 (respectively Lemma 3), then rms follow a mixed bundling strategy and prots are
given in section 3.1 (respectively 3.2). If there is no merger, then prots are presented
in section 2.3. At last, if there is one homogeneous merger (respectively heterogeneous),
the proof of Lemma 1 (respectively Lemma 3) allows us to assert that the merged rm
follows a mixed bundling strategy.26 By comparing the di¤erent payo¤s associated with
the various outcomes, we nd that in equilibrium, it occurs either a homogeneous merger
wave or a heterogeneous one27 (according to the correlation of reservation prices).
The case where the rst rms merge with the wrong partner in order to prevent another
merger is not feasible. Indeed, when a merger is already achieved, there always exists an
incentive to achieve a second merger whatever is the value of delta (see proof of proposition
1 in Reisinger (2006) for the homogeneous case). As rms anticipate this, the rst merger
will be those for which the competition e¤ect created by the second merger is minimized.
Moreover, this rst merger is achieved because, if is not the case, the second mover tries
to benet from the discrimination e¤ect by merging and hurts the prot of the rst mover.
Thus, we are interested in outcomes which trigger a merger wave. As there can be only
one type of merger at the same time, that is two homogeneous or two heterogeneous
mergers, we compare the prots associated with these outcomes according to . Because
the game is symmetric, it is su¢cient to compare the prot of rm A1B1 further to a
homogeneous merger wave and the prot of rm A1B2 further to a heterogeneous wave.
26For clarity reasons, we do not present all asymmetric cases because they are dominated. As an
illustration, we present a case in Appendix 6.3. For more details, please contact the authors.
27Reisinger (2006) shows, in the extension of his model, that an independent pricing equilibrium appears
when the game is sequential. This can occur if rms can commit not to practice bundling. Here, the
merger game is sequential. But, as rms can choose in the rst stage to merge either in a homogeneous
way or in a heterogeneous one, it is never protable for rms to commit to an independent pricing strategy
or to commit not to merge. Indeed, it always exists one type of merger (homogeneous or heterogeneous)
which allows rms to earn higher prots than in the separate sales conguration. This is valid when there
is only one merger or two sequential mergers.
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In order to rank these equilibria prots according to , we must order the thresholds for
which prot functions are modied. These thresholds are given by HM1 , 
HM
2 , 
HT
1 and
HT2 . We already know that 
HT
1 < 
HT
2 and 
HM
1 < 
HM
2 . Moreover, 
HT
2 =
tA tB
5tA+tB
<
HM1 =
3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
). We deduce the following ranking: HT1 < 
HT
2 < 
HM
1 < 
HM
2 . There
is a turnover between the two types of merger according to the correlation of consumers
reservation values for the two energies. This turnover occurs around three thresholds,
i.e., 1, 

2 and 

3. The prots comparison according to  allows the equilibrium and the
associated prots to be computed. The following Proposition28 presents this equilibrium
and Figure 7, below, illustrates the turnover between homogeneous and heterogeneous
merger prots:
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, rms always make more prots than they do in the inde-
pendent pricing case. Moreover, rms choose to merge either in a homogeneous way or
in a heterogeneous one. This depends on the reservation prices correlation. They merge
in a homogeneous way for 0    1 and 2   < 3 and they merge in a heterogeneous
one for 1 <  < 

2 and for 

3    12 .
Insert Figure 7
The intuitions behind the homogeneous merger wave and the heterogeneous merger
wave have already been explained. There is a trade-o¤ between a sorting e¤ect due to
bundling which is positive from the rms point of view and a competition e¤ect passing
through energy bundles ("business-stealing e¤ect", Reisinger 2006). In the homogeneous
merger case, this competition e¤ect exists only if the correlation is weak. In the het-
erogeneous merger case, this competition e¤ect exists only if the correlation is strong.
Thus, when the correlation is su¢ciently high (  1), rms avoid this competition ef-
fect by merging in a homogeneous way. Conversely, if the correlation is su¢ciently weak
(  3), rms avoid this competition e¤ect by merging in a heterogeneous way. The
sorting e¤ect is at a maximum for a weaker correlation with heterogeneous mergers than
it is with homogeneous ones. Therefore, rms choose to alternate between these two types
of mergers when the correlation is intermediate (1 <  < 

3). This alternation is due to
the following fact: according to the type of merger, the maximum prot values occur at
di¤erent levels of correlation. These maximum values correspond to a strong sorting e¤ect
without triggering the business-stealing e¤ect. Indeed, the sorting e¤ect is even stronger
than product bundles, since the two rms are similar from consumers point of view. This
lack of di¤erentiation between bundles nally creates this new competition e¤ect.
Concerning the heterogeneous merger, and therefore the bundles of energies with op-
posite locations, the maximum value of prot is reached at HT2  14 . Concerning the
homogeneous merger, and therefore the bundles of goods with the same location, the
maximum value of prot is reached at HM1  14 . In both cases, the di¤erent opportu-
nities of merger allow rms to benet better from the sorting e¤ect by positioning their
sales on the two energy markets according to the correlation. Because of these merger
opportunities, rms avoid the competition e¤ect between bundles. At the equilibrium, the
competition e¤ect exists only for the two following ranges of parameters corresponding to
28The proof is given in Appendix 6.4.
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"touching" equilibria: 1 <  < 
HT
2 and 
HM
1 <  < 

3. Moreover, these ranges are very
restricted since, respectively, they correspond at the most to 1
5
  16
10000
 36 3
p
114
20
<  < 1
5
and 3
10
<  < 3
p
114 26
20
 3
10
+ 16
10000
. Such is the case when tB ! 0. Indeed, transportation
costs vary the intensity of the two e¤ects and the thresholds dening the di¤erent types of
equilibria. Intuitively, the weaker the transportation cost tB, the weaker the sorting and
the competition e¤ects. The two maximum prot values tend to get closer. Therefore, the
minimum and maximum ranges of correlation become larger. To an extreme degree, when
tB ! 0, bundling has no e¤ect and the price of the gas B is equal to its marginal cost of
production. We nd the Bertrand paradox, since there is no horizontal di¤erentiation of
the gas B and the sorting e¤ect does not exist any more. Conversely, when tB ! tA, the
e¤ects are intensied, and for the two merger cases, the sorting e¤ect is stronger and the
competition e¤ect between energy bundles (business-stealing e¤ect) does not take place
as easily. Indeed, the trade-o¤ between the low price of the bundle and the additional
distance to cover for the gas B tends to favor separate energies consumption. Figure 8,
below, illustrates these two limit cases:
Insert Figure 8
The possibility of the four energy rms merging with rms, either at the same or at
the opposite location, eliminates the prisoners dilemma, which is already underlined in
the two merger types. Indeed, as rms can choose their merger partner in relation to the
correlation of reservation prices, rms can benet better from the sorting e¤ect without
being a¤ected by the competiton e¤ect. In order to evaluate the scope of this study, we
will focus on welfare implications in the following section.
4.2 Welfare analysis
First, we focus on social welfare. As a benchmark, we calculated the maximum welfare.
The welfare is maximized when transportation costs are minimized. Indeed, price levels
do not a¤ect social welfare for the reason that the volume of consumption is unchanged
in this model. Maximum welfare is achieved when consumers who are located at xk
with 0  xk  14 and 34  xk  1 for k = A (respectively k = B) buy electricity A
from rm A1 (respectively gas B from rm B1) and when consumers who are located at
1
4
 xk  34 for k = A (respectively k = B) buy electricity A from rm A2 (respectively
gas B from rm B2). This situation corresponds to the independent pricing case for which
covered distances are minimal. We note W IP social welfare when energy rms follow an
independent pricing strategy:
W IP = W 0   1
48
(tA + tB), (9)
with W 0 = KA +KB   cA   cB.
In this case, consumers always buy the energies that are near their locations. Therefore,
welfare is maximal. Now, we will focus on social welfare in cases of merger waves. We
describe social welfare at the game equilibrium in the following proposition29 and in Figure
9:
29The proof of the Proposition 4 is given in Appendix 6.5.
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Proposition 4 In equilibrium, social welfare is always lower with bundling strategy than
in the independent pricing case or than without merger. Moreover, by noting Wr the
welfare obtained by Reisinger and W the welfare at the equilibrium of our model, we nd
that W = Wr if 0    1 or if 2 <   3, that W < Wr if 1 <   2, and that
W > Wr if 3 <   1=2.
The fact that social welfare is always lower with bundling strategy is due to the sorting
e¤ect created by this strategy. Moreover, the social welfare di¤erences with the model
of Reisinger are explained by the opportunity given to energy rms to merge in di¤erent
ways according to the correlation between the two energy markets. The main intuition is
the following. Firms avoid the competition e¤ect by selecting the right merger partners
according to the correlation of consumers reservation values for the two goods.
Insert Figure 9
When rms do not merge, or when rms sell their goods independently, social welfare
is higer than in the equilibrium of our game. The rst recommendation is as follows:
European Commission should prevent mergers from being allowed to bundle on energy
markets, if one relies on our model assumptions. For instance, one might assume e¢ciency
gains which could make merger advantageous from a social welfare point of view. Another
way for competition authorities might be to forbid bundling. It is interesting to note that
the possibility for rms to choose a type of merger, homogeneous or heterogeneous, makes
our results concerning welfare more balanced than those in Reisinger (2006). But, in
accordance with Reisinger (2006), we note that bundling is harmful to social welfare.
Indeed, the prisoners dilemma disappears, which increases rms prots when correlation
is low. That increases social welfare. When the correlation is low ( > 3), consumers
choose packages with energies from faraway locations, thus there are lower transportation
costs than in the model of Reisinger (2006). On the other hand, for the intermediate values
of correlation, the possibility for rms to merge in homogeneous or heterogeneous ways
can make prots higher but the transportation costs are also considerably higher. This
accounts for social welfare jumps in 1 and 

3. Finally, for high correlation values ( < 

1),
we nd the same equilibrium as Reisinger (2006) and the same level of social welfare.
Moreover, we observe that the competition authorities generally prefer to take consumers
surplus into account rather than social welfare. Thus, we establish the following corollary30
to Proposition 4:
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, the consumers surplus is always lower than in the indepen-
dent pricing case or without merger.
In energy markets, several rms merge and some of these mergers are presented in
Table 1 in the Appendix 6.7. We can think that energy rms merge in order to supply
bundles. In Table 1, we make list of dowstream market mergers in energy markets.
We leave out other types of mergers in energy markets in order to limit other e¤ects
than bundling in incentives to merge, as synergy e¤ects due to a vertical integration
30The proof for Corollary 1 is given in Appendix 6.6.
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for example. So, we can provide merger cases which appear mainly because of bundling
strategies created by mergers. In Italy, the electric rm Enel merged in 2004 with the
gas retailer Italgestioni in the downstream energy market. This example among others
given in Table 1 can be analyzed through the homogeneous and heterogeneous mergers
concepts. This depends on merged rms characteristics with regard to each energy sold
in packages.
Thus, we calculate the consumers surplus. We note SIP , the consumers surplus for
the independent pricing case, corresponding to the maximum surplus case. This value is
easily given by social welfare minus two times the merged rm prot in the independent
pricing strategy:
SIP = W 0   13
48
(tA + tB), (10)
with W 0 = KA +KB   cA   cB.
We can conclude that the analysis of consumers surplus gives the same results as the
social welfare analysis. The rms gains from bundling are insignicant in comparison
with the bundlings e¤ect on social welfare. The graphical representation of equilibrium
consumers surplus is the same as it is with social welfare, with a lower level and the slopes
more pronounced. The analysis of consumers surplus as social welfare comes to the same
conclusion.
5 Conclusion
We observe an increasing number of mergers in the energy markets. A lot of them concern
rms from di¤erent markets such as gas and electricity. Whatever the merger, it allows
rms to supply bi-energy bundles. Our paper studies the bundling e¤ects on merger
incentives in energy markets. We show that bundling strategies always create merger
incentives for specialized rms (electricity or gas rms). The intuitive explanation is the
following. Although competition e¤ects of a merger involving rms from two independent
markets are non-existent with an independent pricing, competition e¤ects appear if the
merger allows product bundling.
First, we show that there is always an incentive to follow a bundling strategy once the
merger is achieved. When bundling is not possible, we nd that there is no incentive to
merge. From these two results, we deduce that bundling strategy generates not only a
merger incentive but also a merger wave. This incentive comes from the sorting e¤ect of
the bundling strategy. However, a competition e¤ect, which is negative for rms prots,
is also generated by the bundling strategy. We nd that, in order to take better advantage
of the sorting e¤ect and to avoid the competition e¤ect, energy rms choose between two
merger types. This choice is function of the correlation of consumers reservation prices
for the two energies. An electric rm can merge with a gas rm at the same location on
the other circle. An electric rm can also merge with a gas rm at opposite location on the
other circle. We call homogeneous and heterogeneous mergers, respectively. These merger
opportunities remove the prisoners dilemma created by the dominance of the competition
e¤ect which is emphasized by Reisinger (2006).
Our model has important implications concerning competition policy. We show that
bundling strategies have a negative e¤ect on social welfare, but in our model this e¤ect is
weaker than in Reisinger (2006). Competition authorities should pay more attention to
16
mergers in domestic markets, such mergers may be authorized by the governments in order
to promote national champions. However, we must note that our analysis dont take into
consideration potential e¢ciency gains following a merger. A direction for future research
could be the introduction of these e¤ects. The introduction of other e¤ects like e¢ciency
gains could a¤ect the results.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Independent pricing case
In the independent pricing case, the computation of the equilibrium is the same as in the
standard model of Salop (1979). We model two independent and horizontally di¤erenti-
ated markets. It should be noted that Ai (respectively Bj) is the prot of the single
rm Ai (respectively Bj). In every case, equilibrium prices are given by:
pA = cA +
1
4
tA, (11)
pB = cB +
1
4
tB.
First, we consider the case where there is no merger. Thus, there are two monoproduct
rms in each energy market, A and B, competing in prices. The equilibrium prots are
given by:
Ai =
1
8
tA, (12)
Bj =
1
8
tB.
We note that zAiBj is the prot of the merged rm AiBj where z = 1; 2 is the number of
mergers. Whether there are one or two homogeneous mergers, the equilibrium prots are
given by:
8i = j, 2AiBj =
1
8
tA +
1
8
tB, or (13)
8i = j, 1AiBj =
1
8
tA +
1
8
tB, 

A i
=
1
8
tA, 

B j
=
1
8
tB.
Whether there are one or two heterogeneous mergers, the equilibrium prots are given by:
8i 6= j, 2AiBj =
1
8
tA +
1
8
tB, or (14)
8i 6= j, 1AiBj =
1
8
tA +
1
8
tB, 

A i
=
1
8
tA, 

B j
=
1
8
tB.
6.2 Heterogeneous mergers
6.2.1 Proof of the Lemma 3
In the case of an heterogeneous merger wave, the rms Ai and Bj are merged 8i 6= j with
i; j = 1; 2: Let us analyze if there is an incentive for the merged rm A1B2 to introduce a
bundle. First, we consider the case where both rms do not bundle. Since the equilibrium
is symmetric, both rms charge the same independent prices pIPA and p
IP
B , and earn prots
of AiBj =
1
2
(pIPA   cA + pIPB   cB) 8i 6= j with i; j = 1; 2. Now, if rm A1B2 introduces
a bundle, that means selling both goods together at a price p12AB < p
1
A + p
2
B. We analyze
the case where p12AB = p
IP
A + p
IP
B , but where p
1
A = p
IP
A + "1 and p
2
B = p
IP
B + "1, with "1 > 0
but small. So, the rm A1B2 increases its prots raising its independent prices by "1 and
sets the bundle price equal to the sum of the independent prices.
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We have to distinguish between two cases, either if  is "near" 1
2
or not, because this
changes the demand structure on the circles. First, look at the case where  is not near
1
2
. If rms do not bundle there are four demand regions on the circles, namely (A1B1);
(A1B2); (A2B2), and (A2B1). The frontiers between these regions (or the marginal
consumers) are given by 1
4
   for the frontier between (A1B1) and (A1B2), by 1
4
for
(A1B2) and (A2B2), by 3
4
for the frontier between (A2B2) and (A1B2) and nally by
3
4
   for (A1B2) and (A1B1).
If the rm A1B2 introduces the bundle (AB12), the frontiers are changed to
1
4
    "1
tB
for the frontier between (A1B1) and (AB12), to 1
4
+ "1
tA
for (AB12) and (A2B2), to 3
4
  "1
tA
for the frontier between (A2B2) and (AB12) and nally to 3
4
     "1
tB
for (AB12) and
(A1B1). The new prot function of rm A1B2 is given by:
A1B2 = (p
1
A + p
2
B   cA   cB)

2"1(
1
tA
+
1
tB
)

+ (p1A   cA + "1)

1
2
  2"1 1
tB

(15)
+(p2B   cB + "1)

1
2
  2"1 1
tA

,
or
A1B2 = 

A1B2
+ 2(p1A   cA)
"1
tA
+ 2(p2B   cB)
"1
tB
+ "1   2("1)
2
tA
  2("1)
2
tB
.
This prot is always higher than the previous prot A1B2 as long as  > 0 because "1
can made arbitrary small and so ("1)
2 tends faster towards 0 than "1. We made the proof
than the merged rm A1B2 has an incentive to introduce its bundle. Let us focus on rm
A2B1 to introduce its bundle if the rm A1B2 is already bundling. The prot of rm
A2B1 if rm A1B2 bundles while rm A2B1 not is given by:
A2B1 = (p
2
A   cA)

1
2
  2"1( 1
tA
)

+ (p1B   cB)

1
2
  2"1( 1
tB
)

.
If the rm A2B1 chooses to bundle (AB21) and set p
21
AB = p
IP
A +p
IP
B , and sells their goods
independently at the price p2A = p
IP
A + "2 and p
1
B = p
IP
B + "2, with "2 > 0 but small,
the frontiers are given by 1
4
     ("1+"2)
tB
for the frontier between (A1B1) and (AB12), by
1
tA tB (
1
4
tB   tB  14tA) for (AB12) and (AB21), by 14   + ("1+"2)tB for the frontier between
(AB21) and (A2B2), by 3
4
   ("1+"2)
tB
for (A2B2) and (AB21), by 1
tA tB ( 34tA+ 34tB tB)
for the frontier between (AB21) and (AB12) and nally by 3
4
  + ("1+"2)
tB
for (AB12) and
(A1B1). The new prot function of rm A2B1; when it proposes bundles, is then:
A2B1 = (p
2
A + p
1
B   cA   cB)

2("1 + "2)(
1
tB
)  1
2
+
1
tA   tB (
1
2
tB   1
2
tA

(16)
+(p2A   cA + "2)

1
2
  2("1 + "2)( 1
tB
)

+ (p1B   cB + "2)

1
2
  2("1 + "2)( 1
tB
)

= A2B1 + "2   4

("2)
2 + "1"2
tB

.
Thus, for "1 and "2 small, bundling is protable since ("2)
2 and ("1"2) tend faster towards
0 than "2. We shown that bundling is always a protable strategy for  small.
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Now let us turn the case where  is near 1
2
. First, we analyze the incentive of rm
A1B2 to introduce its bundle while the other rm practices independent pricing. If rm
A1B2 does not bundle, product combinations are: (A1B2); (A2B2), (A2B1) and (A1B1).
The frontiers are given by 1
4
for the frontier between (A1B2) and (A2B2), by 3
4
   for
(A2B2) and (A2B1), by 3
4
for the frontier between (A2B1) and (A1B1)and nally by
5
4
   for (A1B1) and (A1B2). If merged rm A1B2 bundles, then the frontiers are given
by 1
4
+ "1
tA
for the frontier between (AB12) and (A2B2), by 3
4
     "1
tB
for (A2B2) and
(A2B1), by 3
4
+ "1
tA
for the frontier between (A2B1) and (A1B1) and nally by 5
4
    "1
tB
for (A1B1) and (AB12). The prot of rm A1B2 if it bundles is:
A1B2 = (p
1
A + p
2
B   cA   cB)

"1(
1
tA
+
1
tB
) + 

(17)
+(p1A   cA + "1)

1
2
  "1( 1
tA
+
1
tB
)  

+(p2B   cB + "1)

1
2
  "1( 1
tA
+
1
tB
)  

,
or
A1B2 = (p
1
A   cA + p2B   cB)

1
2
  "1( 1
tA
+
1
tB
)  

(18)
= A1B2 + "1(1  2)  2("1)2

1
tA
+
1
tB

.
A1B2 is always higher than 

A1B2
if  < 1
2
since ("1)
2 tends faster towards 0 than "1.
Therefore, A1B2 has an incentive to bundle. Now, let us analyze the prot of the rm
A2B1 if the rm A1B2 is already bundling. If rm A2B1 chooses not to bundle, its prot
is:
A2B1 = (p
2
A + p
1
B   cA   cB)

1
2
+  + "1(
1
tA
+
1
tB
)

(19)
+(p2A   cA)

 "1( 1
tA
+
1
tB
)  

+ (p1B   cB)

 "1( 1
tA
+
1
tB
)  

=
1
2
(p2A + p
1
B   cA   cB).
If rm A2B1 also bundles, it sets prices p
21
AB = p
IP
A + p
IP
B , sells its goods separately at
p2A = p
IP
A + "2 and p
1
B = p
IP
B + "2, with "2 > 0 but small. Now, the frontiers are given by
1
4
+ ("1+"2)
tA
for the frontier between (AB12) and (A2B2), by 3
4
     ("1+"2)
tB
for (A2B2)
and (AB21), by 3
4
+ ("1+"2)
tA
for the frontier between (AB21) and (A1B1) and nally by
5
4
     ("1+"2)
tB
for (A1B1) and (AB12). Prot of rm A2B1 if both rms bundle is then:
A2B1 = (p
2
A + p
1
B   cA   cB)

1
2
+ "1(
1
tA
+
1
tB
) + "2(
1
tA
+
1
tB
) + 

(20)
+(p2A   cA + "1)

 "1( 1
tA
+
1
tB
)  "2( 1
tA
+
1
tB
)  

+(p1B   cB + "1)

 "1( 1
tA
+
1
tB
)  "2( 1
tA
+
1
tB
)  

,
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or
A2B1 = 

A2B1
+ "2(1  2)  (2"1"2)

1
tA
+
1
tB

  (2"2)2

1
tA
+
1
tB

. (21)
If "1 and "2 are small, then 

A2B1
> A2B1, provided that  <
1
2
. Thus, rm A2B1 also
has an incentive to bundle.
6.2.2 Proof of the consumption combinations:
In order to study the di¤erent equilibria of heterogeneous merger waves, we have to
establish several claims concerning consumption combinations:
Claim 1 There cannot exist direct rivalry between product combination (A1B1) and (A2B2).
Proof. The method of proof is the same than for claim 1 of Reisinger (2006)
Claim 2 .
(?) Take xA and x
0
A with 0  xA; x0A  12 and x0A < xA.
If (AB12) is optimal at xA, then (AB21) can never be optimal at x
0
A.
(??) Take xA and x
0
A with
1
2
 xA; x0A  1 and x0A < xA.
If (AB21) is optimal at xA, then (AB12) can never be optimal at x
0
A.
Proof. The method of proof is the same than for claim 2 of Reisinger (2006)
Claim 3 .
(?) Take xA and x
0
A with 0  xA; x0A  12 and x0A < xA.
If (A1B1) is optimal at xA, then (A2B2) can never be optimal at x
0
A.
(??) Take xA and x
0
A with
1
2
 xA; x0A  1 and x0A < xA.
If (A2B2) is optimal at xA, then (A1B1) can never be optimal at x
0
A.
Proof. The method of proof is the same than for claim 3 of Reisinger (2006)
Claim 4 .
(?) Take xA and x
0
A with 0  xA; x0A  12 and x0A < xA.
If (AB12) is optimal at xA, then (A2B2) can never be optimal at x
0
A.
(??) Take xA and x
0
A with
1
2
 xA; x0A  1 and x0A < xA.
If (A2B2) is optimal at xA, then (AB12) can never be optimal at x
0
A.
Proof. The method of proof is the same than for claim 4 of Reisinger (2006)
Claim 5 .
(?) Take xA and x
0
A with 0  xA; x0A  12 and x0A < xA.
If (A1B1) is optimal at xA, then (AB21) can never be optimal at x
0
A.
(??) Take xA and x
0
A with
1
2
 xA; x0A  1 and x0A < xA.
If (AB21) is optimal at xA, then (A1B1) can never be optimal at x
0
A.
Proof. The method of proof is the same than for claim 5 of Reisinger (2006)
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6.2.3 Proof of the equilibrium: heterogeneous mergers and strong correlation
Assuming  small, we consider a consumer at location xA = 0. If we move clockwise on
circle A, then the consumer who is indi¤erent between (A1B1) and (AB12) is located at:
xA =
1
4
+
p12AB   p1A   p1B
tB
  . (22)
The product combination which is bought to the right of (AB12) is (AB21). The marginal
consumer between to buy the bundle (AB12) and the bundle (AB21) is located at:
xA =
1
tA   tB (p
21
AB   p12AB +
1
4
(tA   tB) + tB). (23)
Moving further to the right the next combination which is bought is (A2B2) and the
marginal consumer is located at:
xA =
1
4
+
p2A + p
2
B   p21AB
tB
  . (24)
If we pass the point 1=2 and move upward on the left side of the circle, we get the same
product structure as on the right side, because of symmetry, only with rm Ai and Bj
reversed. The prot function of rm A1B2 is therefore:
A1B2 = (p
1
A   cA)(
1
4
+
p12AB   p1A   p1B
tB
   + 1
4
+    p
12
AB   p1A   p1B
tB
) (25)
+(p12AB   cA   cB)(
p21AB   p12AB + 14(tA   tB) + tB
tA   tB  
1
4
  p
1
A + p
1
B   p12AB
tB
+ 
+
3
4
+
p1A + p
1
B   p12AB
tB
     p
12
AB   p21AB + 34(tA   tB) + tB)
tA   tB )
+(p2B   cB)(
3
4
+
p21AB   p2A   p2B
tB
     1
4
  p
2
A + p
2
B   p21AB
tB
+ ).
Because of symmetry we get a similar function for rm A2B1. Calculating prices and
prots, for both rms, we get:
pA = cA +
1
4
tA   1
6
tB, (26)
pB = cB +
1
12
tB,
8i 6= j pijAB = cA + cB +
1
4
(tA   tB),
8i 6= j z=2AiBj =
1
8
tA   7
72
tB.
with i; j = 1; 2:When the value of  increases, there is a disappearance of bundle options.
It exist a value of  where the bundle (AB12) is not following by the bundle (AB21):At this
threshold demand structure changes and there is only one option of bundle consumption.
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6.2.4 Proof of the equilibrium: heterogeneous mergers and weak correlation
Assuming  high, we consider a consumer at location xA = 0. If we move clockwise on
circle A, there is a consumer who is indi¤erent between (AB12) and (A2B2) located at:
xA =
1
4
+
p2A + p
2
B   p12AB
tA
. (27)
If we move clockwise on circle A, the next product combination is (AB21). So, The
marginal consumer between (A2B2) and (AB21) is located at:
xA =
3
4
+
p21AB   p2A   p2B
tB
  . (28)
If we pass the point 1=2 and move upward on the left side of the circle A, we get the same
product structure as on the right side, because of symmetry, only with rm Ai and Bj
reversed. Therefore, the prot function of rm A1B2 is:
A1B2 = (p
12
AB   cA   cB)(
1
4
+
p2A + p
2
B   p12AB
tA
  1
4
  p
12
AB   p1A   p1B
tB
+ ) (29)
+(p1A   cA)(
5
4
+
p12AB   p1A   p1B
tB
     3
4
+
p1A + p
1
B   p21AB
tA
)
+(p2B   cB)(
3
4
+
p21AB   p2A   p2B
tB
     1
4
  p
2
A + p
2
B   p12AB
tA
).
Because of symmetry we get a similar function for rm A2B1. Calculating prices and
prots, for both rms, we get:
pA = cA +
1
4
tA + (
1
2
  ) tAtB
3(tA + tB)
, (30)
pB = cB +
1
4
tB + (
1
2
  ) tAtB
3(tA + tB)
,
8i 6= j pijAB = cA + cB +
1
4
(tA + tB),
8i 6= j z=2AiBj =
1
8
(tA + tB)  (1  4(2   )) tAtB
18(tA + tB)
.
6.2.5 Proof of the intermediate thresholds: heterogeneous mergers
For the prot function (26) arises, (A1B1) must be followed by (AB12) and not by
(AB21). The frontier between (A1B1) and (AB12) at the equilibrium prices is given by:
xA =
1
12
  . (31)
The frontier between (A1B1) and (AB21) at the equilibrium prices is given by:
xA =
1
4
+
tB
tA   tB . (32)
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For the demand structure (iii) arises, then (31) must be smaller than (32). This gives the
rst threshold:
HT1 =
1
6
  tB
6tA
. (33)
For the prot prot function (29) to arise, the option consumption (A1B1) must be
followed by (AB21) and not by (AB12). Calculating in the same way as before by inserting
the equilibrium prices corresponding to the prot function (29) in (31) and (32) gives that
demand structure (iv) arises only if:
 > HT2 =
ta  tb
5ta+ tb
. (34)
6.2.6 Proof of the intermediate equilibrium: heterogeneous mergers
In the region such as 1
6
  tB
6tA
<   ta tb
5ta+tb
, rms set their prices in such a way that demand
structure (iv) arises. Prices are determined in order to satisfy the following constraint:
1
4
+
p2A + p
2
B   p12AB
tA
 3
4
+
p21AB   p2A   p2B
tB
   (35)
This means that (A2B2) is followed by (AB12) and not by (AB21), and that thresholds
HT1 and 
HT
2 are given by (26) and (30) respectively. Because of the instability of the
demands for these parameter values, we use a linear interpolation of the equilibrium prices
given by (26) for HT1 and by (30) for 
HT
2 . We check that prices and prots given below
constitute an equilibrium in the competition game:
pA = cA +
1
4
tA +
tAtB
2(tA   tB)2 (3(tB   tA) + 2(8tA + tB)), (36)
pB = cB +
1
4
tB +
tAtB
2(tA   tB)2 (3(tB   tA) + 2(8tA + tB)),
8i 6= j pijAB = cA + cB +
1
4
(tA + tB) +
tAtB
2(tA   tB)2 (6(tB   tA) + 6(5tA + tB),
8i 6= j z=2AiBj =
1
8
tA +
1
8
tB +
tAtB
2(tA   tB)2 (3(tB   tA) + 2(8tA + tB)  4
2tA).
6.3 Proof of the Proposition 2
Consider a homogeneous merger case, where A1 and B1 merge and the two other rms
A2 and B2 are independent. This appendix is still valid if A2 and B2 merge but sell their
products separately. The merger prot of A2 and B2 is merely the sum of A2 and B2.
As an illustration, we focus on the case where correlation of reservation values is weak,
that is for 0 <  < 3(ta+tb)
2(5ta+tb)
. If the merged rm follows an independent pricing strategy,
then prots are given by:
A1B1 =
1
8
tA +
1
8
tB,
A2 =
1
8
tA and B2 =
1
8
tB.
Prices are given by: p1A = p
2
A =
1
4
tA and p
1
B = p
2
B =
1
4
tB.
26
If the merged rm practices mixed bundling, prots are the following:
A1B1 =
t2B + 2tAtB + t
2
A + 4
2tAtB
8(tA + tB)
,
A2 =
1
8
tA and B2 =
1
8
tB.
Prices are given by: p11AB =
1
4
tA+
1
4
tB, p
1
A =
1
4
tA(2tB+tB+tA)
tA+tB
, p1B =
1
4
tB(2tA+tA+tB)
tA+tB
, p2A =
1
4
tA
and p2B =
1
4
tB.
Comparing these two outcomes, since
t2B+2tAtB+t
2
A+4
2tAtB
8(tA+tB)
> 1
8
tA +
1
8
tB, the merged
rm A1B1 has an incentive to practice mixed bundling. There is a trade-o¤ between two
e¤ects. First, the bundle of the merged rm decreases the market shares of independent
rms. Then, as prices of goods sold independently of merged rm are higher than those
of independent rms (e.g. p1A > p
2
A and p
1
B > p
2
B), there is a positive e¤ect on the market
shares of independent rms. In this conguration, these two e¤ects perfectly o¤set, what
explains that the prots of independent rms are not a¤ected by the rivals bundle. By
increasing its prices of separate sales, with unchanged market share, the competitor earns
more prots by bundling its goods together.
6.4 Proof of the Proposition 3
Prots corresponding to homogeneous and heterogeneous merger waves are equal for three
values of  parameter.
Indeed, for 1 =
3(24t2A+27tAtB+3t
2
B 
p
21t4
B
+246t3
B
tA+981t
2
B
t2
A
+1212t3
A
tB+456t
4
A
)
4(10t2
A
+7tAtB+t
2
B
)
, with HT1 <
1 < 
HT
2 , the heterogeneous merger prot corresponding to the equilibrium (7) is equal
to the homogeneous merger prot corresponding to the equilibrium (3). After 1, the
equilibrium prot (7) becomes greater than the equilibrium prot (3).
Next, for 2 =
1
4
, with HT2 < 

2 < 
HM
1 , the heterogeneous merger prot correspond-
ing to the equilibrium (8) is equal to the homogeneous merger prot corresponding to
the equilibrium (3). After 2, the equilibrium prot (3) becomes greater than to the
equilibrium prot (8).
Finally, for 3 =
 (52t2A+67tAtB+7t2B 
p
21t4
B
+246t3
B
tA+981t
2
B
t2
A
+1212t3
A
tB+456t
4
A
)
4(10t2
A
+7tAtB+t
2
B
)
, with HM1 <
3 < 
HM
2 , the heterogeneous merger prot corresponding to the equilibrium (8) is equal
to the homogeneous merger prot corresponding to the equilibrium (4). After 3, the
equilibrium prot (8) becomes greater than the equilibrium prot (4).
It is easy to prove these di¤erent prot functions are monotonic for considered para-
meter values. Thus, prot di¤erences increase or decrease as specied here. It is also easy
to prove that there is only for these three values of , that are 1, 

2, and 

3, that prots of
heterogeneous and homogeneous merger wavesbecome level. Moreover, for tA  tB  0;
the following ranking is still valid: 0  HT1  1  HT2  2 = 14  HM1  3  HM2  12 :
We can deduce the following lemma:
Lemma 5 If 0    1, in equilibrium, rms choose to merge in a homogeneous way.
Prices and prots are given by (3).
If 1 <  < 

2, in equilibrium, rms choose to merge in a heterogeneous way. Prices
and prots are given by (36) for 1 <  < 
HT
2 and by (30) for 
HT
2   < 2.
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If 2   < 3, in equilibrium, rms choose to merge in a homogeneous way. Prices
and prots are given by (3) for 2   < HM1 and by (4) for HM1 <  < 3.
If 3    12 , in equilibrium, rms choose to merge in a heterogeneous way. Prices
and prots are given by (30).
6.5 Proof of the social welfare
6.5.1 Proof of the social welfare: homogeneous mergers
See Reisinger (2006).
6.5.2 Proof of the social welfare: heterogeneous mergers
As in the previous appendix, we compute the welfare by integrating equilibrium prices
in every frontiers of consumption combinations and by calculating total transportation
costs. It is not necessary to compute the welfare for  < 1
6
  tB
6tA
since it is never the
equilibrium welfare. Here, we compute the welfare when 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) <   1
3
+ tB
6tA
and
when  > 1
3
+ tB
6tA
. If 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) <   1
3
+ tB
6tA
:
WHT2 = KA +KB   cA   cB (37)
 tA
0
BB@
  1
4
tB 4tB tA
tA tBZ
0
(x)2dx+
1
2Z
  1
4
tB 4tB tA
tA tB
(
1
2
  x)2dx
1
CCA
 tA
0
BB@
  1
4
3tB 4tB 3tA
tA tBZ
1
2
(x  1
2
)2dx+
1Z
  1
4
3(tB tA) 4tB
tA tB
(1  x)2dx
1
CCA
 tB
0
BB@
  1
4
3(tB tA) 4tB+8tA
tA tB
+ 1Z
0
(x)2dx+
1
2Z
  1
4
5(tB tA) 4tB+8tA
tA tB
+ 1
(
1
2
  x)2dx
1
CCA
 tB
0
BB@
  1
4
3(tB tA) 4tB+8tA
tA tB
+Z
1
2
(x  1
2
)2dx+
1Z
  1
4
3(tB tA) 4tB+8tA
tA tB
+
(1  x)2dx
1
CCA .
After some manipulations, we get:
WHT2 = KA +KB   cA   cB  
1
48
(tA + tB) (38)
  tAtB
(tA   tB)(
2   )  1
24
(t2A   3tAtB + 2t2B)
(tA   tB)
= W IP   tAtB
(tA   tB)(
2   )  1
24
(t2A   3tAtB + 2t2B)
(tA   tB) .
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Finally, for  > 1
3
+ tB
6tA
, the welfare is given by:
WHT3 = KA +KB   cA   cB (39)
 tA
0
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1
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(x)2dx+
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0
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 5tA+4tA 9tB+12tB
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2
)2dx+
1Z
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+
(1  x)2dx
1
CCA .
After some manipulations, we get :
WHT3 = KA +KB   cA   cB  
1
48
(tA + tB) (40)
 4
9
(tAt
2
B
2)
(tA + tB)2
+
1
144
(48t2AtB + 112tAt
2
B)
(tA + tB)2
  1
144
6t3A + 33t
2
AtB + 40tAt
2
B   3t3B
(tA + tB)2
= W IP
 4
9
(tAt
2
B
2)
(tA + tB)2
+
1
144
(48t2AtB + 112tAt
2
B)
(tA + tB)2
  1
144
6t3A + 33t
2
AtB + 40tAt
2
B   3t3B
(tA + tB)2
.
6.5.3 Proof of the social welfare at game equilibrium with bundling
The appendices 6.5.1 and 6.5.2, as the Lemma 5 allow to determine the social welfare at
equilibrium game.
Lemma 6 In equilibrium, the social welfare is given by:
WHM1 = W
IP   4
9
2 tAtB
tA+tB
if 0    1,
WHT2 = W
IP   tAtB
(tA tB)(
2   )  1
24
(t2A 3tAtB+2t2B)
(tA tB) if 

1 <  < 
HT
2 ,
WHT3 = W
IP   4
9
tAt
2
B
2
(tA+tB)2
+ 
144
48t2AtB+112tAt
2
B
(tA+tB)2
  1
144
6t3A+33t
2
AtB+40tAt
2
B 3t3B
(tA+tB)2
if HT2   < 2,
WHM1 = W
IP   4
9
2 tAtB
tA+tB
if 2   < HM1 ,
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WHM2 = W
IP   (1
4
+ 2   ) (tA+tB)tAtB
(tA tB)2 if 
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1 <  < 

3,
WHT3 = W
IP   4
9
(tAt
2
B
2)
(tA+tB)2
+ 1
144
(48t2AtB+112tAt
2
B)
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  1
144
6t3A+33t
2
AtB+40tAt
2
B 3t3B
(tA+tB)2
if 3    12 .
6.5.4 Proof of the welfare comparaison with that of Reisinger (2006)
For 0    1, WHM1 = W IP   492 tAtBtA+tB . We obtain, for these parameter values, that
WHM1 = WR.
For 1 <   HT2 , we obtain WHT2 = W IP   tAtB(tA tB)(
2   )   1
24
(t2A 3tAtB+2t2B)
(tA tB) .
But, for these parameter values, WR = W
IP   4
9
2 tAtB
tA+tB
. By comparison, we nd that
WHT2  WR =   tAtB(tA tB)(
2   )  1
24
(t2A 3tAtB+2t2B)
(tA tB) +
4
9
2 tAtB
tA+tB
< 0.
For HT2 <   2, we obtainWHT3 = W IP 49
tAt
2
B
2
(tA+tB)2
+ 
144
48t2AtB+112tAt
2
B
(tA+tB)2
  1
144
6t3A+33t
2
AtB+40tAt
2
B 3t3B
(tA+tB)2
.
But, for these parameter values, WR = W
IP   4
9
2 tAtB
tA+tB
. By comparison, we nd that
WHT3  WR =  49
tAt
2
B
2
(tA+tB)2
+ 
144
48t2AtB+112tAt
2
B
(tA+tB)2
  1
144
6t3A+33t
2
AtB+40tAt
2
B 3t3B
(tA+tB)2
+ 4
9
2 tAtB
tA+tB
 0.
For 2 <   HM1 , we obtain WHM1 = W IP   492 tAtBtA+tB . But, for these parameter
values, WR = W
IP   4
9
2 tAtB
tA+tB
. Thus, we obtain that WHT3 = WR.
For HM1 <   3, we obtain WHM2 = W IP   (14 + 2   ) (tA+tB)tAtB(tA tB)2 . But, for these
parameter values, WHM2 = WR.
For 3 <   HM2 , we obtain WHT3 = W IP   49
(tAt
2
B
2)
(tA+tB)2
+ 1
144
(48t2AtB+112tAt
2
B)
(tA+tB)2
 
1
144
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2
AtB+40tAt
2
B 3t3B
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. But, for these parameter values,WR = W
IP (1
4
+2 ) (tA+tB)tAtB
(tA tB)2 .
Thus, we obtain thatWHT3  WR =  49
(tAt
2
B
2)
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2
B)
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2
B 3t3B
(tA+tB)2
+
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(tA tB)2 > 0.
At last, for HM2 <   12 , we obtain WHT3 = W IP   49
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we obtain that WHT3  WR =  49
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6.6 Proof of the consumers surplus
6.6.1 Proof of the consumers surplus: homogeneous mergers
We just subtract two equilibrium prots from equilibrium welfare to nd the consumers
surplus. For a homogeneous merger wave and for  < 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
), the consumers surplus
is given by:
SHM1 = KA +KB   cA   cB  
13
48
(tA + tB) (41)
 39
72
(tA + tB)  8
9
2
tAtB
tA + tB
= SIP   39
72
(tA + tB)  8
9
2
tAtB
tA + tB
.
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For a homogeneous merger wave and for 3
2
( tA+tB
5tA+tB
) <  < 1
3
+ tB
6tA
, the consumers surplus
is given by:
SHM1 = KA +KB   cA   cB  
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  2
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
312tBt
2
A + 72tAt
2
B
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24tAt
2
B   72tBt2A
(tA   tB)2 .
6.6.2 Proof of the consumers surplus: heterogeneous mergers
We just subtract two equilibrium prots from equilibrium welfare to nd the consumers
surplus. For a heterogeneous merger wave and for 1
6
  tB
6tA
<  < ta tb
5ta+tb
, the consumers
surplus is given by:
SHT2 = KA +KB   cA   cB  
13
48
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  2
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For a heterogeneous merger wave and for  > ta tb
5ta+tb
the consumers surplus is given by:
SHT3 = KA +KB   cA   cB  
13
48
(tA + tB) (44)
  1
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(39t2A + 94tAtB + 39t
2
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9
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(tA + tB)
.
6.6.3 Proof of the consumers surplus at equilibrium game with bundling
The Appendices 6.6.1 and 6.6.2, as the Lemma 5, allow to determine the consumers
surplus at the equilibrium.
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Lemma 7 In equilibrium, the consumers surplus is given by:
SHM1 = S
IP   39
72
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6.7 Domestic and downstream mergers examples
Companies Countries Industries Date
E.ON - Hein Gas (10%) Germany Electricity/Gas 2002
E.ON - EAM (27%) Germany Electricity/Gas 2002
Enel - Sicilmetano Italy Electricity/Gas 2003
Enel - Marcotti Italy Electricity/Gas 2003
EWE - SWB (32.4%) Germany Electricity/Gas 2003
EWE - Cuxhaven (74.9%) Germany Electricity/Gas 2003
Hidrocantabrico - Naturcorp (62%) Spain Electricity/Gas 2003
E.ON - Distributors of Westphalia Germany Electricity/Gas 2003
Enel - Ottogas, Vendita Italy Electricity/Gas 2004
Enel - Italgestioni gas Italy Electricity/Gas 2004
Table 1: Recent pure downstream mergers between European electricity and gas rms
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